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In case law the lessor’s tacit hypothec has been extended to cover movable property
belonging to a third party. This extension of the hypothec is reasonably well established,
but there is some uncertainty about the reasons or justifications for it. Two seemingly
contradictory explanations for the extension have been raised in the literature, namely
implied consent and estoppel. Upon closer scrutiny the former reason appears in fact to refer
to (judicially) imputed rather than implied consent. Provided that the consent is judicially
attributed to the third-party owner of the movables on the ground that she should have
been aware of the whereabouts of her property and should have taken the necessary and
reasonable steps to protect it against the landlord’s hypothec (for example by informing the
landlord of her right in the property), this seems to be an acceptable explanation for the
extension of the hypothec. The same can be said for estoppel in cases where the
requirements for estoppel are actually proved, particularly if fault (negligence) is required
and if it is proven that the owner of the movables could have disabused the landlord of the
false impression that the movables belonged to the tenant, but failed to do so. From a
policy perspective, it can therefore be said that the extension of the hypothec to movables
that belong to a third party is justified, provided that the reasons for the extension (either
imputed consent or estoppel) are understood correctly, and the accompanying requirements
are applied correctly and strictly. From a constitutional property perspective, the
deprivation of property that extension of the hypothec brings about when a third party’s
property is affected by the landlord’s right to attach and sell the movables would be
constitutionally unassailable (not arbitrary in terms of s 25(1) of the Constitution) if there
is sufficient reason for the deprivation. Provided the requirements are applied correctly and
strictly, in line with the policy explanations (imputed consent or estoppel) that explain the
extension satisfactorily, the deprivation of a third party’s property that results from
extension of the hypothec should generally speaking not be arbitrary, and thus should be
constitutionally uncontroversial. This conclusion contradicts views to the contrary that
have been expressed in the academic literature.
I INTRODUCTION
The lessor’s tacit hypothec (also known as the landlord’s tacit hypothec) is a
real security right that improves the chances of the lessor to recover rent in
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arrears. In principle, the lessor’s tacit hypothec attaches to the lessee’s
movable property found on the leased premises when rent is due but not
paid. A sub-lessee’s property may also be subject to the lessor’s tacit hypothec
to the extent that the sub-lessee owes rent.
Signiﬁcantly, the lessor’s tacit hypothec may extend to property belonging
to third parties (other than the lessee or sub-lessee) found on the leased
premises. Extending the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property is
usually justiﬁed with reference to one of two grounds, namely implied
consent or estoppel. To the extent that a proper application of these
justiﬁcations also limits the extension of the hypothec to third parties’
property, third parties are protected against the unjustiﬁed extension of the
lessor’s tacit hypothec. In this article we analyse the justiﬁcations for the
extension of the hypothec to third parties’ property so as to gauge their
implications for the scope of extending the hypothec.
The common-law position regarding the extension of the lessor’s tacit
hypothec to third parties’ property has been amended by the Security by
Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 19931 (‘SMMPA’) to provide more
protection to third parties. However, despite the degree of statutory
protection that the Act provides, scholars and judges have cast doubt on the
justiﬁcation for extending the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property
that is not covered by the SMMPA. The critics’ principal argument is that
there is no contract between the lessor and a third party that could underlie
the extension of the hypothec in these cases on the basis of implied consent.
Some critics also reject the doctrine of estoppel as a justiﬁcation for the
extension of the lessor’s hypothec to third parties’ property. Accordingly,
some critics argue that the lessor’s tacit hypothec should never be extended to
property that belongs to third parties. Recent debate has also suggested that if
constitutionally challenged, the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to
third parties’ property might be found to be inconsistent with s 25 of the
Constitution,2 which prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property.
In this article we describe the common-law principles that provide for the
extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property. More
speciﬁcally, we consider the justiﬁcations for extending the lessor’s tacit
hypothec to property that belongs to third parties, as well as the protective
measures developed under the common law and by Parliament for third
parties who might be affected. Our view is that the conundrum that courts
and scholars face regarding the justiﬁcation for extending the lessor’s tacit
hypothec to third parties’ property is a result of ﬂawed reasoning. The case
law concerning the justiﬁcation of the extension often fails to recognise that
the lessor’s tacit hypothec is a limited real right that arises by operation of law:
ie without the co-operation of the parties. Furthermore, uncertainties
surrounding the extension of the hypothec to third parties’ property have
been exacerbated in case law by a consolidation (or confusion) of the
1 See s 2.
2 TheConstitution of theRepublic of SouthAfrica, 1996.
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implied-consent and estoppel approaches into a single justiﬁcation. Based on
our analysis of the two approaches, we argue in this article that the
common-law principles that provide for the extension of the lessor’s tacit
hypothec — correctly applied — adequately protect third parties whose
movables are not covered by the SMMPA. Furthermore, we argue in this
article that the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to the property of a
third party does not constitute an arbitrary deprivation as meant by s 25, and
it is therefore constitutionally valid.
Part II of the article explains the extension principle and its origins. Parts
III and IV describe and analyse the justiﬁcations for extending the lessor’s
tacit hypothec to third parties’ property. Part V sets out and analyses statutory
protection for certain third parties against the lessor’s tacit hypothec. Part VI
examines the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property
in view of s 25 of the Constitution.
II THE EXTENSION PRINCIPLE AND ITS ORIGINS
The lessor’s tacit hypothec is a real security right that developed in Roman
law3 and Roman-Dutch law4 and was adopted in South African law.5 This
3 D 20.2.7 (English translation of the Digest referred to here is fromTMommsen,
P Kruger & A Watson The Digest of Justinian Vol II (1985)). See also Rena van den
Bergh ‘The development of the landlord’s hypothec’ (2009) 15 Fundamina 155 at 158;
Andrew Borkowski & Paul du Plessis Textbook on Roman Law (2005) 304; Paul van
Warmelo An Introduction to the Principles of Roman Civil Law (1976) 116; W W Buck-
land A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (1975) 475; R W Lee The
Elements of Roman Law with a Translation of the Institutes of Justinian 4 ed (1956) 172;
H F Jolowicz Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (1954) 319; F Schulz
Classical Roman Law (1951) 407–8.
4 Van Leeuwen RHR 4 13 12. See also Voet 20.2.5; T J Roos & H Reitz Principles
of Roman-Dutch Law (1909) 89; R W Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 5 ed (1953)
188; Manfred Nathan Common Law of South Africa Vol II (1904) 936; A F S Maasdorp
The Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence of Hugo Grotius 3 ed (1903) 188; T Berwick
A Contribution to an English Translation of Voet’s Commentary on the Pandects (1902) 308;
D P de Bruyn The Opinions of Grotius as Contained in the Hollandsche Consultatien en
Advijsen (1894) 186.
5 See Friedlander v Croxford & Rhodes (1867) 5 Searle 395; Baker v Hirst & Co (1880)
2 NLR 55 at 57; Longlands v Francken 1881 Kotzé 256; Isaacs v Hart & Henochsberg
(1887) 8 NLR 18; Webster v Ellison 1911 AD 73; Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons
Ltd 1929AD 266; Columbia Furnishing Co v Goldblatt 1929AD 27. For a discussion of
the lessor’s tacit hypothec see Hanri Mostert & Anne Pope (eds) The Principles of the
Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 325; Graham Bradﬁeld & Karin Lehmann Prin-
ciples of the Law of Sale and Lease 3 ed (2013) 158; C G van der Merwe ‘Real security’
in François du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 656;
P Havenga, M Havenga, R Kelbrick, M McGregor, H Schulze, K van der Linde
General Principles of Commercial Law 6 ed (2007) 178; J T R Gibson, C Visser, J T Pre-
torius, R Sharrock & M van Jaarsveld (eds) South African Mercantile and Company Law
8 ed (2003) 182;WE Cooper Landlord and Tenant 2 ed (1994) 180; T J Scott & S Scott
Wille’s Law of Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa 3 ed (1987) 99; M A Diemont,
R M Marais & P J Aronstam The Law of Hire-Purchase in South Africa 4 ed (1978) 208;
AF S Maasdorp Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law Vol II 8 ed (1960) 193; Lee op
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real security right accrues by operation of law, without the co-operation of
the parties, when rent is due but not paid.6 The hypothec terminates upon
payment of the due amount.7 The lessor’s tacit hypothec applies both where
the lessee is able but unwilling to pay the due amount of rent for some reason,
and where the lessee is insolvent. In cases where the lessee is unwilling to pay
arrear rent, the lessor’s tacit hypothec entitles the lessor to have the lessee’s
property attached and sold in execution.8 Attachment therefore grants the
lessor a right of ﬁrst preference over the proceeds of the sale in execution of
the lessee’s movable property.9 However, upon the lessee’s insolvency, where
the lessee is unable to pay the arrear rent, the lessor automatically acquires a
right of ﬁrst preference against unsecured creditors.10
In principle, the lessor’s tacit hypothec applies to the lessee’s movable
property (invecta et illata, fruits, and crops of the leased property)11 found on
the leased premises and property attached while in transit to a new
destination subsequent to removal from the premises.12 If the lessee’s
property proves insufﬁcient to secure the lessor’s claim, a sub-lessee’s
property found on the leased premise may also be subject to the lessor’s tacit
hypothec, but only to the extent that the sub-lessee owes rent.13
cit note 4 at 189; George Wille Landlord and Tenant in South Africa 4 ed (1948) 189;
Roos & Reitz op cit note 4 at 94; Nathan op cit note 4 at 936; A F S Maasdorp The
Institutes of Cape Law Book II (1903) 255.
6 See Pinn v Elliot (1904) 21 SC 366; Noble v Heatley 1905 TS 433; Frank v Van Zyl
[1957] 2All SA149 (C); Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment 2003 (2) SA495
(T) at 514E–G. See also Bradﬁeld & Lehmann op cit note 5 at 158; P J Badenhorst,
J M Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 405.
Scott & Scott op cit note 5 at 99 state that the lessee cannot be prevented from dealing
with and disposing of his movables so long as the lessee is not in arrears with the rent.
7 Koenigsberg, Hopkins & Co v Robinson Gold Mining Co Ltd 1905 TH 90 at 95–6.
See also Noble v Heatley supra note 6; Hamp-Adams v Loubser 1911CPD 564 at 568.
8 Section 32(1) of the Magistrates’CourtsAct 32 of 1944. See furtherAC Cilliers,
C Loots & H C Nel Herbstein and Van Winsen: The Civil Procedure of the High Courts and
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Vol 2 5 ed (2009) 1456–7.
9 Before attachment the lessor does not have a real security right, but a personal
right to acquire a real right. Attachment therefore converts the lessor’s personal right
into a real security right: Webster v Ellison supra note 5 at 94. See also G F Lubbe
‘Mortgage and pledge’ (revised byT J Scott) in LTC Harms & JAFaris (eds) LAWSA
Vol 17(2) 2 ed (2008) para 437; Van der Merwe in Wille’s Principles op cit note 5 at 631;
Badenhorst et al op cit note 6 at 357.
10 Section 85(2) of the InsolvencyAct 24 of 1936. See also Holderness NO & others v
Maxwell & others [2012] ZAKZPHC49 at 20; Scott & Scott op cit note 5 at 100.
11 Invecta et illata are movable goods brought on to the leased premises by the
lessee.
12 WG Baker v Ellison & Co (1880) 2 NLR 55; Leech v Gardner, reported in (1898)
15 Cape LJ 206; Bourne & Co v Lindsay 1912 TPD 144; Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw
& Sons 1916TPD 230. See further Lubbe op cit note 9 para 439;Wille op cit note 5 at
192.
13 Friedlander v Croxford & Rhodes supra note 5 at 397; Smith v Dierks (1884) 3 SC
142; Ex parte Aegis Assurance & Trust Co Ltd (1909) 23 EDC 363; Ex parte Adler 1911
EDL106; Reinhold & Co v Van Oudtshoorn 1931TPD 382 at 383. In Yost Typewriter Co
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The most striking and controversial feature of the lessor’s tacit hypothec is
that it may extend to property that belongs to third parties (other than the
lessee or a sub-lessee) found on the leased premises. However, this could only
occur if the lessee’s and sub-lessee’s property found on the leased premises
proves insufﬁcient to secure the lessor’s claim for arrear rent. The extension
principle was developed in seventeenth century Roman-Dutch law, and in
Hollandsche Consultatien Grotius explained it as follows:
‘If things have been carried into leased premises with the knowledge and also
the consent of the owner in order to remain there for the duration of the lease,
and to be used by the tenants they are subject to the landlord’s hypothec, but it
is otherwise if the owner was ignorant.’14
Voet reviews the principal authorities on this subject and states the law in the
following manner:
‘Only such invecta et illata, however are bound by tacit mortgage as are the
tenant’s own property; unless they have been taken into the hired premises with
the consent of their owner with a view to be kept there permanently, or for the
use of the tenant, such for example as beds, chairs and instruments of the art
which the tenant exercises in the house, for their owner has thereby tacitly
consented to this tacit mortgage of his property, at least in subsidium of any
deﬁciency in the illata of the tenant himself, nor can he be considered clear of
fraud when with the full knowledge of the facts, he dissembled and did not
inform the lessor [of his ownership].’15
The extension principle has been accepted in South African law16 and its
justiﬁcations were set out in Bloemfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd17 as
follows:
‘When goods belonging to a third person are brought on to leased premises
with the knowledge and consent, express or implied, of the owner of the
goods, and with the intention that they shall remain there indeﬁnitely for the
use of the tenant, and the owner, being in a position to give notice of his
ownership to the landlord fails to do so, and the landlord is unaware that the
goods do not belong to the tenant, the owner will thereby be taken to have
consented to the goods being subject to the landlord’s tacit hypothec and liable
to attachment.’18
v Andrew 1915 NPD 21 the court held that the lessee is also entitled to a hypothec
over goods of the sub-lessee.
14 De Bruyn op cit note 4 at 186. See also Van Leeuwen 1.4.9.3, who supports this
view.
15 Voet 20.2.5. See alsoNathan op cit note 4 at 936.
16 Longlands v Francken supra note 5. See also Lazarus v Dose (1884) 3 SC 42 at 44;
Mackay Brothers v Cohen (1894) 1 OR 342 at 344; Heugh’s Trustee v Heydenrych (1895)
12 SC 318 at 320; Collins v Whittock (1899) 9 HCG 182; Noble v Heatley supra note 6;
Turpin v Wagstaff & Sons 1906TS 597; Russell v Savory (1906) 20 EDC 100 103; Border
and Allen v Gowlett 1911OPD 29.
17 Supra note 5.
18 Bloemfontein Municipality supra note 5 at 271. See also Fresh Meat Supply Co v
Standard Trading Co (Pty) Ltd 1933CPD 550.
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Accordingly, the SouthAfrican common-law position is that the lessor’s tacit
hypothec may extend to third parties’ property only if it was brought on to
the leased premises with the knowledge and consent of its owner, to remain
on the leased premises indeﬁnitely for use by the lessee. Stated differently,
property belonging to third parties is subject to the lessor’s tacit hypothec if
the third party knows that his property is on the leased premises but fails to
inform the lessor of his ownership of the property prior to attachment.
III JUSTIFICATION FOR THE EXTENSION
(a) Introduction
For many years, there has been uncertainty regarding the justiﬁcation for the
extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property to satisfy the
lessor’s claim for arrear rent. In TR Services (Pty) Ltd v Poynton’s Corner Ltd &
others,19 WarnerAJ expressed the following view:
‘[I]t is very difﬁcult to discover the true basis for the landlord having a hypothec
over the goods of third parties in the possession of the tenants . . . except upon
the basis of implied consent by the owner to the goods becoming subject to the
hypothec. This . . . appears to be a strange approach because I ﬁnd the greatest
difﬁculty in believing that any owner, if asked the question, would agree to his
goods being made subject to such hypothec. He would almost inevitably reply:
‘‘Of course I do not agree to it; why should I?’’ ’20
In Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment,21 Van der Walt J in an obiter
dictum observed that there is no legal relationship between the lessor and a
third party whose movables are on the leased premises. Therefore, there can
be no justiﬁcation to attach the third party’s property as security for the debt
of the lessee.22 Other scholars also argue that there is no legal basis for
extending the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property, and that the
hypothec should therefore not extend to third parties’ property.23
Judging from the case law, the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to
third parties’property is supposedly based either on implied consent or on the
doctrine of estoppel. In what follows we analyse these justiﬁcations in case
law and academic literature, with the objective to identify the requirements
for each justiﬁcation and to determine when and how each of the justiﬁca-
tions applies, or rather how they should apply.
19 1961 (1) SA773 (N).
20 TR Services (Pty) Ltd v Poynton’s Corner Ltd supra note 19 at 775D–H. A J M
Steven ‘Landlord’s hypothec in comparative perspective’ (2008) 12 EJCL 1 at 14
concurs with this view.
21 Supra note 6.
22 Ibid 500G–H.
23 In this regard see D Smith ‘The constitutionality of the lessor’s hypothec:
Attachment of a third party’s goods’ (2011) 27 SAJHR 308 at 330; Steven op cit note
20 at 15; J S McLennan ‘A lessor’s hypothec over the goods of third parties – anomaly
and anachronism’(2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 121 at 123.
LESSOR’S TACIT HYPOTHEC TO THIRD PARTIES’ PROPERTY 523
(b) Implied consent
According to the ﬁrst approach, the extension principle is supposedly based
on the third party’s implied consent that his property can be utilised as
security for payment of arrear rent by the lessee.24 The circumstances under
which the third party’s consent to the lessor’s tacit hypothec may be implied
have never been clearly analysed by South African courts, but the courts
nevertheless often rely on this justiﬁcation for extending the lessor’s
hypothec.25
Disputes regarding third parties’ property usually occur when a third-party
owner seeks to recover his movable property from the leased premises and
the lessor relies on his hypothec to attach the movables for sale in execution.
In such circumstances the onus is on the lessor to prove that the hypothec
exists and also that it attaches to third parties’ property found on the leased
premises.26 The lessor can discharge this onus by proving the four require-
ments that were set out in the Bloemfontein Municipality judgment, namely:
(i) The movable property is on the premises with the knowledge and
consent of its owner;
(ii) the lessor must have been unaware of the fact that the property belongs
to someone other than the lessee before attachment;
(iii) the movable property must be present on the lease premises with some
degree of permanence and not merely temporarily; and
(iv) the property must be there for use by the lessee.27
These requirements are discussed below with reference to their applica-
tion in case law prior to 1929; in Bloemfontein Municipality; and in post-1929
case law. Although these requirements were already developed in Roman-
Dutch law, the decision in Bloemfontein Municipality was a pivotal moment in
the development of the extension principle in South African law because, as
we explain below, the court extended the third party’s knowledge and
consent requirement further than it had been applied before.
(i) Third parties’knowledge and consent
Prior to the decision in Bloemfontein Municipality, South African courts
accepted that the lessor’s tacit hypothec could only extend to third parties’
24 Bloemfontein Municipality supra note 5 at 271.
25 Baker v Hirst & Co supra note 5 at 55; Longlands v Francken supra note 5; Noble v
Heatley supra note 6; Turpin v Wagstaff & Sons supra note 16; Carstens v Basson 1912
CPD 170; Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons supra note 12. In Barclays Western
Bank Ltd v Dekker & another 1984 (3) SA 220 (D) at 222C–D, Kumleben J expressed
the view that implied consent is inferred when an owner has failed to inform the
lessor of his ownership of property on the leased premises when he could reasonably
be expected to have done so.
26 Ncora v Untiedt 1916 EDL 32; TR Services (Pty) Ltd v Poynton’s Corner Ltd supra
note 19 at 775C–D; Barclays Western Bank Ltd v Dekker supra note 25 at 222C–D. See
also Nathan op cit note 4 at 938; Wille supra note 5 at 196; Graham Glover Kerr’s The
Law of Sale and Lease 4 ed (2014) 456.
27 Bloemfontein Municipality supra note 5 at 271.
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property if the third party had actual knowledge that his property was on the
leased premises. For instance, in Heugh’s Trustee v Heydenrych28 the respon-
dent had let the furniture to the lessee (the insolvent) of certain leased
premises, who later moved the furniture to new premises without the
respondent’s knowledge and consent. The court held that it was impossible
to hold the respondent responsible for the new lessor’s belief that the
furniture belonged to the insolvent. DeVilliers CJ reasoned that the owner of
the furniture, being unaware of the removal, could not have given notice of
his ownership to the new lessor, and therefore the lessor’s tacit hypothec did
not apply to such furniture.29
In 1929 a major development took place with the then Appellate
Division’s decision in Bloemfontein Municipality.30 The respondents sold
furniture in terms of a hire-purchase agreement to Smit, who was then living
on the leased premises situated in Shannon Valley. The respondents gave
notice of their ownership of the furniture to the landlord of the premises in
which the property was used.Without giving notice to the respondents, Smit
moved from Shannon Valley to 205 Monument Road. Upon Smit’s failure
to pay the hire-purchase instalments, the respondents issued summons against
Smit, but the sheriff was unable to serve him with the summons at Shannon
Valley. However, with the assistance of the respondents’ attorneys, Smit was
served with the summons at 205 Monument Road. Consequently, the
respondents re-possessed the furniture. Subsequent to payment of the due
instalments, the furniture was returned to Smit at 205 Monument Road.
Bloemfontein Municipality then attached the property found on the
leased premises, including the respondents’ furniture, under a judgment for
arrear rent. The question was whether the respondents’ property was subject
to the lessor’s tacit hypothec.31 The court rejected the respondents’ argument
that knowledge of its attorneys could not be imputed to it because the
28 Supra note 16.
29 Ibid at 320. Another example is Bradlow & Co v Lucas 1917 TPD 314, where B
sold furniture to W in terms of a hire-purchase agreement subject to a reservation of
ownership clause, and informed W’s lessor of the hire-purchase agreement. Thereaf-
ter, the lessor transferred ownership of the premises to his son and no notice of change
of ownership was given to B. When W fell in arrears with the rent, the new lessor
attached themovable assets found on the leased premises, including B’s furniture. The
court held that, inasmuch as B had done everything in its power to show that it did
not consent to the furniture being subject to the lessor’s tacit hypothec, its furniture
could not be subject to the lessor’s tacit hypothec. See also Lazarus v Dose supra note
16 at 44; Mackay Brothers v Cohen supra note 16 at 344; Collins v Whittock supra note
16; Noble v Heatley supra note 6; Turpin v Wagstaff & Sons supra note 16; Russell v
Savory supra note 16 at 103; Ncora v Untiedt supra note 26; Goldinger’s Trustee v White-
law & Sons supra note 12; Mangold Bros Ltd v Hirschman Bros 1917 TPD 187 at 189;
Colonial Cabinet Manufacturing Co v Wahl 1924 CPD 282 at 284; Bradlow v Ward 1929
TPD 313; Sercombe v Colonial Motors (Natal) Ltd 1929 NPD 58 at 65; Rand Furnishing
Co v Hydenrych 1929TPD 583.
30 Supra note 5 at 266.
31 Ibid at 271.
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attorneys were only its agents for the purpose of issuing summons for
recovery of the due instalments. The court stated that ordinary prudence
demands that an owner of property sold in terms of a hire-purchase
agreement should protect itself in some way.32 Furthermore, the hire-
purchase agreement did not prohibit Smit from removing the furniture
without ﬁrst obtaining the consent of the respondents, nor did it contain a
clause binding Smit to give notice to the respondents in case he moved to
new premises. The court held that the respondents were in a position to ﬁnd
out where Smit was living, but failed to do so and to take other reasonable
measures to protect themselves.33 As a result, the court inferred from the
respondents’ conduct that the respondents implicitly consented to the lessor’s
tacit hypothec.34 In other words, even though the third party had no actual
knowledge of its property being on the leased premises, the court ascribed
knowledge (implied consent) to it on the basis that it could or should have
known the whereabouts of its property.
In Fresh Meat Supply Co v Standard Trading Co,35 the respondents sold
electric appliances to Birke (the lessee) in terms of a hire-purchase agree-
ment. The agreement obliged Birke to notify the respondents of his new
lessor’s name and address in the event that he moved to new premises.36
However, the hire-purchase agreement was not completely ﬁlled-in, and did
not indicate whether Birke was living on the leased premises. The respon-
dents accepted an incomplete agreement and had no knowledge that Birke
kept its furniture on the leased premises. Subsequent to Birke’s failure to pay
rent, the furniture was attached by the appellant in terms of a judgment for
arrear rent. The question was whether the respondents’ furniture was subject
to the lessor’s tacit hypothec. The court relied on Bloemfontein Municipality for
the view that consent to the lessor’s tacit hypothec may be extended on the
basis of implied knowledge even when the owner does not in fact know that
his property had been kept on the leased premises. The court held that the
clause that imposed an obligation on Birke to notify the respondents of his
move, and the new address, was not sufﬁcient to protect the respondents
against the lessor’s tacit hypothec. The respondent had not taken reasonable
steps to protect its property, and consequently it had implicitly consented that
its property could be subject to the lessor’s tacit hypothec.37
Cooper criticises the decisions in Bloemfontein Municipality and Fresh Meat
Supply Co. He argues that the respective courts were not entitled to infer that
the respondents implicitly consented to the respective lessors’ tacit hypoth-
ecs, unless the respondents’ knowledge that their property had been used on
32 Ibid at 273.
33 De Villiers ACJ, Wessels JA and Stratford JAwrote separate judgments but con-
curred with the judgment of Curlewis JA.
34 Bloemfontein Municipality supra note 5 at 272–8.
35 Supra note 18.
36 Fresh Meat Supply Co v Standard Trading Co ibid.
37 Ibid at 555–66.
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the leased premises could have been established.38 Nevertheless, Cooper
contends that both decisions could be justiﬁed on the basis that the
hire-purchase agreements did not prohibit the lessees from removing the
goods to other premises without the consent of the respondents.39 Cooper’s
view can be interpreted to mean that Bloemfontein Municipality and Fresh Meat
Supply Co should have been decided on the basis of estoppel rather than
implied consent. It is arguably a pity that the Appellate Division failed in
Bloemfontein Municipality to apply the doctrine of estoppel, which at that
point in time had already received judicial recognition as a basis for the
extension of the hypothec.40 The court’s failure to apply the doctrine of
estoppel in Bloemfontein Municipality strengthened the view instead that the
extension of the hypothec is based on the third party’s implied knowledge
and consent. The result is that third parties’ property may be subject to the
lessor’s tacit hypothec even if the third parties have no actual knowledge that
their property is present at and being used on the leased premises. This
development expands the area of applicability of the hypothec, and weakens
the position of the owners of potentially affected movable property.
(ii) The lessor’s knowledge of ownership
The lessor’s tacit hypothec does not extend to the third party’s property if the
lessor is aware that the property belongs to someone other than the lessee.41
Knowledge of ownership may be inferred from the nature of the lessee’s
business or occupation,42 as well as from the fact that the property bears a
notice that it is the property of a third party.43
In Paradise Lost Properties (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of SA (Pty) Ltd44 the
respondents sold but reserved ownership of a business and its assets until the
full purchase price was paid. The applicant obtained default judgment against
the lessee (debtor) for arrear rent, and attached property found in the debtor’s
possession, including the respondents’ property. The trial court held that the
third party’s property found on the leased premises could not be subject to
the lessor’s tacit hypothec because the lessor knew before attachment that the
38 Cooper op cit note 5 at 188–9. See also Scott & Scott op cit note 5 at 102–3.
39 Cooper ibid.
40 See Lazarus v Dose supra note 16; Mackay Brothers v Cohen supra note 16; Heugh’s
Trustee v Hydenrych supra note 16; Ncora v Untiedt supra note 26; Colonial Cabinet
Manufacturing Co v Wahl supra note 29; Rand Furnishing Co v Hydenrych supra note 29.
In Turpin v Wagstaff & Sons supra note 16 at 599, Innes CJ stated that there may be
cases in which estoppel would operate.
41 Heugh’s Trustee v Heydenrych supra note 16; Collins v Whittock supra note 16;
Bradlow & Co v Lucas supra note 29; Bradlow v Ward supra note 29; Rand Furnishing Co
v Heydenrych supra note 29 at 591; Bloemfontein Municipality supra note 5 at 273. See
also Glover op cit note 26 at 459.
42 Henderson v Waldron (1885) 6 NLR 89; Mackay Brothers v Cohen supra note 16 at
344; Fresh Meat Supply Co v Standard Trading Co (Pty) Ltd supra note 18 at 556; Paradise
Lost Properties (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of SA (Pty) Ltd 1997 (2) SA815 (D).
43 TR Services (Pty) Ltd v Poynton’s Corner Ltd supra note 19 at 776C–D.
44 1997 (2) SA815 (D).
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property belonged to a third party. On appeal it was argued that the lessor did
not know that the property belonged to a third party. The court held that,
because the lessor had received a copy of the hire-purchase agreement, it
could not heedlessly ignore the facts that were before it.45 Accordingly, the
appeal was dismissed.
In Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment46 the respondents leased
movable property to the lessee, who used it on the leased premises owned by
the appellant. Neither the lessee nor the respondent informed the lessor that
the property belonged to the respondents. The appellant claimed that the
respondents’ property found on the leased premises was subject to the lessor’s
tacit hypothec for arrear rent. The court held that if the lessor acquires
knowledge that the property belongs to a third party before attachment, his
hypothec should not extend to the third party’s property. The decisions in
Paradise Lost Properties and Eight Kaya Sands were recently conﬁrmed in
Holderness NO & others v Maxwell & others,47 where the court held that if the
lessor becomes aware that the property belongs to a third party before
attachment, his hypothec cannot extend to such movable property.48
Sher argues that as a result of the judgment in Paradise Lost Properties the
lessor’s position has been weakened, since actual knowledge of the fact that
the property used on the leased premises belongs to a third party is no longer
a deciding requirement.49 He argues that the subjective standard of the
lessor’s actual knowledge has been replaced by the objective standard of
whether the lessor, by exercising reasonable care, could or should have
established that the property did not belong to the lessee. Sher points out that
the move from a subjective to an objective standard may result in the
exclusion of more movables from the lessor’s tacit hypothec, which under-
mines the lessor’s security.50 At the same time this development extends the
protection of third parties whose property might be affected by extension of
the hypothec.
It is indeed arguable that the courts are moving away from the lessor’s
actual-knowledge requirement regarding the true ownership of the property,
to a test of imputed knowledge. This shift is apparent from Paradise Lost
Properties, where the court held that the lessor could not argue that he was not
aware of the true position if, by taking certain steps, he could have known the
true state of affairs. The judgment in Paradise Lost Properties has strengthened
third parties’ protection against the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec
because, as a result of this judgment, the lessor can no longer be allowed to
ignore the facts regarding the true ownership of the property and to proceed
to attach third parties’ property.
45 Ibid at 823B.
46 Supra note 6 at 499.
47 Supra note 10 para 28.
48 Ibid paras 34 and 35.
49 H Sher ‘The lessor’s security for payment of the rent’ (1997) 5 JBL 114 at 116.
50 Ibid.
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(iii) Degree of permanence
The third requirement for the extension of the hypothec to third parties’
property is that the third party’s property should have been brought on to the
leased premises to remain there indeﬁnitely.51 This requirement is not met if
the property is leased to the lessee on a monthly basis and only a few months
have passed.52 For instance, in Mangold Bros Ltd v Hirschman Bros53 the court
held that a vehicle supplied by an employer to an employee to be used solely
in the course of his employment was not subject to the lessor’s tacit hypothec;
in such cases the element of permanence is absent, since the employer can at
any time take his vehicle back.54 Conversely, in The Standard and Diggers’
News Company v Esterhuizen55 a piano sold in terms of a hire-purchase
agreement to the lessee of a certain premises was held to be on the leased
premises for permanent use by the lessee and was therefore subject to the
lessor’s tacit hypothec.56 In TR Services (Pty) Ltd, Warner AJ expressed the
view that it is difﬁcult to know what is required under the time factor, but
when the leased property is on the premises for a period of ﬁfteen years, the
requirement of permanence is certainly met.57 Accordingly, the lessor’s tacit
hypothec cannot extend to third parties’ property that is on the leased
premises for temporary use by the lessee.
(iv) For use by the lessee
The ﬁnal requirement that the lessor must prove for his hypothec to include
third parties’property is that the movable property was on the leased premises
for use by the lessee.58 This fact can be inferred from the nature of the
property or from the circumstances.59 For instance, in Crowley v Domony60
the lessee’s wife brought some furniture into the house rented by her
husband. She claimed that the furniture was not subject to the lessor’s tacit
hypothec. The court held that the property was there for use by the lessee
and his wife, and was therefore subject to the lessor’s tacit hypothec.61
51 Bloemfontein Municipality supra note 5 at 271.
52 Lazarus v Dose supra note 16.
53 Supra note 29.
54 See further Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons supra note 12 at 241. Contrast
with Ordemann v Peinke 1911 EDL201.
55 1893H 22.
56 Ibid at 24. See also Bloemfontein Municipality supra note 5 at 271. However, see
Spayile v Bower 1911 CPD 65 at 68; Leech v Gardner supra note 12, where the respec-
tive courts held that the requirement of permanency means no more than that the
goods should not be on the premises merely temporarily.
57 Supra note 19 at 776H.
58 Baker v Hirst & Co supra note 5 at 55. See further Longlands v Francken supra note
5; Lazarus v Dose supra note 16; Noble v Heatley supra note 6; Turpin v Wagstaff & Sons
supra note 16; Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons supra note 12; Bloemfontein
Municipality supra note 5 at 271.
59 Wille op cit note 5 at 198. See also Scott & Scott op cit note 5 at 104.
60 1869 Buch 205.
61 Scott & Scott op cit note 5 at 104 argue that this case was wrongly decided,
because the requirement is that the property should be destined for the use by the
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In Reinhold & Co v Van Oudtshoorn62 a bona ﬁde sub-lessee’s property was
attached for arrear rent owed by the lessee. The court held that the
sub-lessee’s property was not subject to the lessor’s tacit hypothec, because it
was not brought onto the premises for use by the lessee. Further, in Van den
Bergh, Melamed & Nathan v Polliack & Co63 the court held that a radiogram
that was bought in terms of a hire-purchase agreement by the lessee’s son, for
his use, was not subject to the lessor’s tacit hypothec.64
Against the backdrop of the cases discussed so far, it appears that the
consent required for the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third
parties’ property has nothing to do with the lease agreement between the
lessor and the lessee, but rather amounts to consent that the court may
impute or ascribe to the third party if certain requirements are met. Since the
third party is not involved in any contractual relationship with the lessor, the
reference to implied consent is misleading in this context. What is described as
implied consent is therefore in fact imputed consent.
It is therefore necessary to clarify the effect of the knowledge and consent
requirement as it was developed in Bloemfontein Municipality. Should the
courts impute knowledge and consent to a third party who is not in fact
aware that his property is used on the leased premises, purely on the basis that
the third party has not done enough to protect himself against the lessor’s
tacit hypothec?65 Or should consent only be imputed to a third party who in
fact knew that his property was used on the leased premises, but failed to
inform the lessor of his ownership of the property? In our view, the latter
interpretation is preferable, since it is unreasonable to expect a third party
who does not actually know that his property is used on the leased premises
to give notice to the lessor, merely to protect himself against the possibility
that the lessee may fall in arrears with rent payments. However, the case law
indicates that even in cases where a third party whose property might be
affected by an extension of the landlord’s tacit hypothec was in fact unaware
that his property was present on the leased premises, the courts are willing to
ascribe consent to that third party if the (rather vague and conﬂicting)
requirements are met. The most signiﬁcant requirement seems to be that the
third party could or should have been aware of the presence of his movable
property on the leased premises and failed to protect the property against the
hypothec by giving notice of ownership to the lessor. To that extent, the
development in case law and the confusion of implied consent and estoppel
justiﬁcations for extending the hypothec tends to exacerbate the potentially
negative effect of the hypothec on the movable property of third parties.
lessee and that the marriage relationship in this case did not imply that the property
was there for use by the lessee.
62 Supra note 13.
63 1940TPD 237.
64 See further Bloemfontein Municipality supra note 5 at 278.
65 Heugh’s Trustee v Heydenrych supra note 16; Collins v Whittock supra note 16;
Bradlow & Co v Lucas supra note 29 at 314; Bradlow v Ward supra note 29.
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On the other hand, the lessor’s tacit hypothec is not extended to third
parties’ property where the lessor became aware of the ownership of the
movable property before perfection of the hypothec, and the courts seem to
move towards a stricter objective test as far as this requirement is concerned.
The analysis of the imputed-consent requirements above also shows that
movable property that is subject to a contract of lease can probably not be
subject to the lessor’s tacit hypothec, at least in so far as it is brought on to the
leased premises for temporary use only. The courts’ approach protects third
parties’ property against the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to the
extent that failure to prove any of these requirements means that the lessor’s
tacit hypothec does not extend to the third parties’ property.
(c) Estoppel
The second justiﬁcation for the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to
third parties’ property is the doctrine of estoppel.66 The doctrine, which
originated in English law,67 entails that a party who has by means of a
representation wilfully or negligently misled another to believe reasonably in
the existence of a state of affairs and thereby induced that person to act to his
detriment, will in litigation between the parties be precluded from denying
that the facts were as he represented them, provided that to uphold the
representation would not be contrary to public policy.68
The requirements for estoppel are a misrepresentation; reliance by the
estoppel asserter on the misrepresentation; prejudice; causation; and fault.
There is some indication that fault is not required in all cases of estoppel.69
However, the majority of authors support the view that fault (dolus or culpa)
is required in cases where estoppel is used as a limitation of the rei
vindicatio.70 Since the application of the doctrine of estoppel to the
extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec implies that the third party’s rei
vindicatio against the lessor could be limited, requiring fault strengthens the
protection of the owner — ie third parties whose property might be affected
by extension of the hypothec.
Although the doctrine of estoppel was formally adopted in South African
law in In re Reynolds Vehicle & Harness Factory Ltd,71 its recognition as a
limitation of the third party’s rei vindicatio already received attention in cases
66 Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment supra note 6 at 507A.
67 In re Reynolds Vehicle & Harness Factory Ltd (1906) 23 SC 703.
68 J C Sonnekus The Law of Estoppel in South Africa (2000) 31.
69 Sonday v Surrey Estate Modern Meat Market (Pty) Ltd 1983 (2) SA 521 (C) at 534.
See also Sonnekus op cit note 68 at 135–6; Ina Knobel ‘The tacit hypothec of the
lessor’ (2004) 67 THRHR 687 at 694.
70 Grosvenor Motors (Potchefstroom) Ltd v Douglas 1956 (3) SA 420 (A); Johaadien v
Stanley Porter (Paarl) (Pty) Ltd 1970 (1) SA394 (A); Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria
Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 441 (A); Quenty’s Motors (Pty) Ltd v
Standard Credit Corporation Ltd 1994 (3) SA188 (A); Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm
Spilhaus & Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA273 (A). See also Sonnekus op cit note 68 at 136.
71 Supra note 67 at 712.
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regarding the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec as early as 1884.72 For
instance, in Lazarus v Dose73 it was stated that the third party would be
estopped from denying that he intended them to become bound as security to
the lessor if he failed to inform the lessor that the property belonged to him.74
In the context of extending the lessor’s hypothec this justiﬁcation has been
mentioned in subsequent case law, but it has never been properly formulated,
nor has it been applied clearly and consistently.
In Eight Kaya Sands,75 Van der Walt J expressed the view that there could
be no justiﬁcation for the property of a third person serving as security for the
debt of the lessee unless there was a misrepresentation (‘skyn’) at the time of
attachment that the property belonged to the lessee. In the same case, Preller
AJ stated that the estoppel approach justiﬁes the extension of the lessor’s tacit
hypothec to third parties’ property on the basis of the appearance that the
owner generates.76 One can deduce that the court preferred the doctrine of
estoppel as the justiﬁcation for the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to
third parties’ property, but it did not apply the estoppel requirements clearly
and consistently.
The majority of academic authors support the view that estoppel is the
better justiﬁcation for extending the hypothec. Lubbe argues that the court
in Eight Kaya Sands favoured the estoppel approach by the emphasis it placed
on the element of a culpable misrepresentation by the third party.77
According to Cooper, estoppel justiﬁes the subjection of a third party’s
property to the lessor’s tacit hypothec.78 Knobel argues that the property of a
third party can only be attached if a third party who is in a position to give
notice to the lessor fails to do so.79 She also contends that estoppel provides a
more equitable ground for subjecting a third party’s property to the lessor’s
tacit hypothec, and that it has a greater foundation in reality than implied
consent. Knobel argues that legal certainty and equitable results will be
72 Lazarus v Dose supra note 16.
73 Ibid.
74 The possibility for application of estoppel in the extension of lessor’s tacit
hypothec cases is also apparent in early cases: Lazarus v Dose supra note 16; Mackay
Brothers v Cohen supra note 16; Heugh’s Trustee v Hydenrych supra note 16; Turpin v
Wagstaff & Sons supra note 16; Ncora v Untiedt supra note 26; Colonial Cabinet Manufac-
turing Co v Wahl supra note 29; Rand Furnishing Co v Hydenrych supra note 29; Bloem-
fontein Municipality supra note 5 at 271; Fresh Meat Supply Co v Standard Trading Co
(Pty) Ltd supra note 18. In Turpin v Wagstaff & Sons supra note 16 at 599, Innes CJ
stated that there may be cases in which estoppel would operate.
75 Supra note 6 at 501I–502A.
76 Ibid at 507A.
77 Lubbe op cit note 9 para 440. McLennan op cit note 23 at 123 argues that the
court in Eight Kaya Sands supra note 6 at 501B adopted the ‘skyn’concept and that the
explanation of the court has some resemblance to estoppel.
78 Cooper op cit note 5 at 183.
79 Knobel op cit note 69 at 695.
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facilitated by an unambiguous adoption of the estoppel approach, including a
fault requirement in the form of at least negligence.80
There are authors who disagree, though. According to McLennan it is
difﬁcult to see how a third party’s carelessness or negligence could constitute
consent for the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’
property.81 He argues that the estoppel assertor should be aware of the
presence of the property on his premises and that this is not a requirement for
the lessor’s tacit hypothec, since the lessor does not need to know about the
presence of such goods on the premises before the rent is in arrears. Hence,
McLennan argues that implied consent does not justify the extension of the
hypothec to third parties’ property either, since there is no contractual privity
between the lessor and the third party.82 In short, McLennan argues that
implied consent, fault and appearance are all hopeless explanations for the
extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property and would
therefore prefer that third parties’ property should never be used as security
for the debt of the lessee without his actual consent.83
Steven argues that implied consent is a ﬁction whereby the owner is taken
to have accepted his property being subjected to the lessor’s tacit hypothec.
He further argues that since implied consent is a ﬁction, the notion that
consent is inferred when the owner was negligent in asserting his ownership
should be dismissed.84 Smith also states that there is no legal nexus or contract
between the lessor and the third party, and therefore the lessor’s tacit
hypothec should not extend to the third party’s property.85
The discussion of the literature above shows that all but two authors86
prefer the estoppel approach, inclusive of the fault requirement, as the
justiﬁcation for extending the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’
property. However, even though the analysis of case law above suggests that
the courts have in fact relied on estoppel when they justiﬁed the extension of
the hypothec in terms of implied consent, South African courts have not yet
justiﬁed the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property
on the basis of estoppel explicitly, clearly and consistently.
IV EVALUATION
For a third party’s property to be subject to the lessor’s tacit hypothec, the
imputed-consent approach requires that the property must have been
brought on to the leased premises to remain there indeﬁnitely for use by the
lessee. The estoppel approach provides that a third party, with knowledge of
his property being used on the leased premises, could be estopped from
80 Ibid.
81 McLennan op cit note 23 at 122.
82 Ibid at 123.
83 Ibid.
84 Steven op cit note 20 at 14–15.
85 Smith op cit note 23 at 330.
86 Steven op cit note 20 at 14–15;McLennan op cit note 23 at 123.
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instituting the rei vindicatio against the lessor if his property had been
attached for the arrear rent of the lessee as a result of his failure to notify the
lessor of his ownership of the property. If the imputed-consent approach is
followed, the lessor has to prove that the hypothec applies to a third party’s
property on the basis that it would be fair for the court to impute consent to
the third party, whereas the estoppel approach expects the lessor to prove that
the third party’s action or inaction in asserting its ownership of the movables
constitutes a misrepresentation that caused the lessor to act to his detriment.
The onus of proof in the two instances is not that far apart, but it would make
a difference if the requirements for each approach are applied clearly and
consistently. More speciﬁcally, clear and consistent application of the
estoppel approach would probably place a heavier burden on the lessor,
especially if he has to prove fault on the side of the third party.
It is apparent from the analysis above that there are uncertainties concern-
ing these justiﬁcations for extending the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third
parties’ property. The case law seems to favour the imputed-consent
approach, but in some cases the courts apparently rely on the doctrine of
estoppel, albeit without explicitly saying so or applying its requirements
consistently. This is especially apparent from the recent decision in Eight
Kaya Sands, where the court more or less explicitly showed its willingness to
justify the extension of the hypothec on the basis of estoppel, but again
without actually applying its requirements.87 Some scholars reject the
imputed-consent approach and prefer the doctrine of estoppel, inclusive of
the fault requirement, as a justiﬁcation for the extension of the lessor’s tacit
hypothec to third parties’ property; but a few scholars reject both justiﬁca-
tions and would prefer the lessor’s tacit hypothec never to apply to third
parties’ property.
These uncertainties regarding the justiﬁcations for extending the lessor’s
tacit hypothec were recognised by Lubbe,88 who is of the view that the
Appellate Division in Bloemfontein Municipality reduced the consent require-
ment to a ﬁction, while at the same time importing considerations that would
be relevant to estoppel, such as negligence on the part of the third party.89 He
argues that the possibility to develop the estoppel approach, which existed in
early case law, has been obscured by the tendency in later decisions to
telescope both approaches into a single enquiry.90 In his view, the require-
ment that the lessor must be ignorant of the fact that the lessee is not the
owner of the goods may be relevant to the requirement of inducement for
the doctrine of estoppel.91 Lubbe’s view is that a return to a dualistic
approach will be conducive to greater clarity in that it will enable the
requirements for the doctrine of estoppel to be restricted to the conceptual
87 Eight Kaya Sands supra note 6 at 501I–502Aand 507A.
88 Lubbe op cit note 9 para 440.
89 Ibid para 441.
90 Ibid para 440. See also Knobel op cit note 69 at 695.
91 Lubbe op cit note 9 para 440.
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basis for the doctrine’s meaning and relevance, while clearly distinguishing
estoppel cases from imputed-consent cases.92
Lubbe’s suggestion that our law should return to a dualistic approach is
plausible, since it may assist the courts to decide cases on the basis of either of
the approaches. An explicitly dualistic approach might also help avoid the
confusion that follows from claiming to apply one approach, while in fact
relying on the other. Unfortunately, in Bloemfontein Municipality the Appel-
late Division failed to develop the estoppel approach, which at that point in
time had already received judicial recognition as a basis for extending the
lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property.93 In fact, Bloemfontein
Municipality should have been decided on the basis of estoppel rather than on
the basis of imputed consent. The tendency in decisions such as Bloemfontein
Municipality to telescope the two approaches into a single enquiry has led the
courts to decide all cases on the basis of imputed consent, even when they
should have been decided on the basis of estoppel.
Furthermore, it is important to recognise that the consent required for
extending the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property is not in any
way related to the lease agreement between the lessor and the lessee. Hence,
a better explanation of consent (usually called ‘implied consent’) in cases
involving extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec is that the law may impute
(or ascribe) consent to a third party whose property may be affected by an
extension of the landlord’s hypothec, provided that certain requirements are
met. The argument that implied consent does not justify the attachment of
third parties’ property because there is no contract between the lessor and a
third party whose property is found on the leased premises then appears to be
less problematic, since the judicial imputation of consent of this kind does not
require contractual privity: the lessor’s tacit hypothec is a real security right
acquired by operation of law, and without the co-operation of both parties.94
Taking into consideration the controversy surrounding the justiﬁcations
for extending the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property, and the
meaning of imputed consent in the extension of the lessors’ tacit hypothec,
we think that both imputed consent and estoppel could justify the extension
of the lessors’ tacit hypothec to third parties’ property if they are applied
correctly. Each justiﬁcation should be applied in situations where it ﬁts best.
Hence, imputed consent should apply only in cases where a third party had
actual knowledge of his property being used on the leased premises, but
without having created a misrepresentation that could found an estoppel
defence. On the other hand, estoppel should apply in cases where the third
party was in a position to protect himself against the extension of the lessor’s
92 Ibid. See alsoVan derMerwe in Wille’s Principles op cit note 5 at 658.
93 See Lazarus v Dose supra note 16; Mackay Brothers v Cohen supra note 16; Heugh’s
Trustee v Hydenrych supra note 16; Turpin v Wagstaff & Sons supra note 16; Ncora v
Untiedt supra note 26; Colonial Cabinet Manufacturing Co v Wahl supra note 29.
94 See in general Badenhorst et al op cit note 6 at 403–25 for a discussion of real
security rights that are created by operation of law.
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tacit hypothec but failed to do so, but without having had actual knowledge
of his property being on the leased premises. Applying the common-law
principles in this manner would be in line with the views expressed by the
seventeenth and eighteenth century Roman-Dutch law writers.95
V A NOTE ON STATUTORY PROTECTION FOR THIRD
PARTIES
The common-law position regarding the extension of the lessor’s tacit
hypothec has been amended by the SMMPA. Section 2(1) of the Act
provides as follows:
‘Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the common law or in any other
law, movable property;
(a) which, while hypothecated by a notarial bond mentioned in section 1(1), is in the
possession of a person other than the mortgagee; or
(b) to which an instalment agreement as deﬁned in in section 1 of the
National Credit Act96 relates, shall not be subject to a landlord’s tacit
hypothec.’
Section 2(1) of the Act protects two categories of third parties against the
extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec, namely third parties who have
notarial bonds registered over their movable property, and third parties who
sold their property in terms of an instalment agreement. Section 2(2) of the
Act provides that these third parties are only protected in terms of s 2(1) if the
notarial bond is registered in terms of s 61(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47
of 1937 before the lessor’s tacit hypothec is perfected.97 The implication of
s 2(2) is founded on the rule prior in tempore potior in iure, which provides
that the ﬁrst real security right to be created is the strongest and enjoys
preference on the debtor’s insolvency.98 Prior to the coming into operation
of the Act, property belonging to a credit provider could be subject to the
lessor’s tacit hypothec only if the credit provider failed to give the lessor
notice of the existence of the instalment agreement.99 Section 2(1) of theAct
amended this position. As the law stands now, property to which an
instalment agreement relates is no longer subject to the lessor’s tacit
hypothec.100 Therefore, the Security by Means of Movable Property Act has
95 De Bruyn op cit note 4 at 186. See alsoVoet 20.2.5; Van Leeuwen 1.4.9.3.
96 Previously s 2(1)(b) referred to the deﬁnition of an instalment sale transaction in
s 1 of the repealed Credit AgreementsAct 75 of 1980. Currently an instalment agree-
ment is deﬁned in s 1 of the National CreditAct 34 of 2005 (see Sch 2 of the National
CreditAct 34 of 2005).
97 Section 2(2) of the SMMPA. See also Mostert & Pope (eds) op cit note 5 at 328;
Lubbe op cit note 9 para 440; Van der Merwe in Wille’s Principles op cit note 5 at 658;
Badenhorst et al op cit note 6 at 405.
98 For an explanation of the rule prior in tempore potior in iure see Scott & Scott
op cit note 5 at 101 and 264–5.
99 See s 8 of the CreditAgreementsAct. See also Scott & Scott op cit note 5 at 102.
100 Section 2(1)(b) of the SMMPA.
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strengthened the protection of certain third parties whose movables might
otherwise have been subject to the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec.
VI THE PROPERTY CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
(a) Introduction
The extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property has not
yet been subjected to a constitutional challenge in the South African courts.
However, academic commentators have suggested that, if challenged, the
extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property might be
inconsistent with the property clause.101 Those in favour of this view base
their argument on foreign case law in which a similar extension had been
challenged (albeit unsuccessfully),102 as well as on their interpretation of the
judgment in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South
African Revenue Service & another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v
Minister of Finance (‘FNB’).103
McLennan discusses the extension of the hypothec to third parties’
property, but does not directly deal with the effect of the property clause on
the extension of the hypothec, although he seems to accept that extension of
the hypothec to third parties’ property might have a constitutional effect.104
Smith argues that the lessor’s tacit hypothec would, if challenged, be
unconstitutional in so far as it arbitrarily and unjustiﬁably deprives third
parties of their property.105 The major premise of his argument is that neither
the imputed consent nor the estoppel approach justiﬁes the attachment of
third parties’ property because there is no legal nexus (in the form of a
contract) between the lessor and a third party whose property is found on the
leased premises.106
We disagree with Smith’s argument, but consider it a valuable exercise to
analyse the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’property in
view of the South African property clause. The purpose of the property
clause (s 25 of the Constitution) is to balance private and public interests in
101 Smith op cit note 23 at 319–30; Steven op cit note 20 at 16.
102 RCA Global Communications Inc v Executive Office Towers, Civil Action No
79-3712 (E D La 1981) (unpublished opinion). In RCA Global it was argued (unsuc-
cessfully) that the lessor’s hypothec violated the due process clause of the United
States Constitution because it allowed for the attachment of the third party’s property
to satisfy the debts of another person and therefore amounts to an unreasonable
deprivation of property. Smith op cit note 23 at 316 argues that this unsuccessful
argument ‘could be raised in South Africa against the constitutionality of the lessor’s
hypothec because it could be argued that it amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of
property when it operates over the goods of a third party’.
103 2002 (4) SA768 (CC).
104 McLennan op cit note 23 at 123.
105 Smith op cit note 23 at 319–30. See further Steven op cit note 20 at 14–15.
106 Smith ibid at 313.
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property.107 Section 25(1) provides that ‘[n]o one may be deprived of
property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may
permit arbitrary deprivation of property’. The FNB case is still the leading
decision on the property clause.108 In FNB, the Constitutional Court
resolved a number of uncertainties and debates regarding the interpretation
of s 25(1), and brought some clarity regarding the approach to be followed
when interpreting and applying this section in a constitutional property
challenge.109 Furthermore, the FNB judgment introduced a methodology for
analysing s 25 disputes, which has signiﬁcant implications for the application of
the s 25 requirements for a valid deprivation or expropriation of property.110
Roux lists the seven stages of the FNB methodology as follows:
‘(a) Does that which is taken away from [the property holder] by the operation
of [the law in question] amount to property for purpose of s 25?
(b) Has there been a deprivation of such property by the [organ of state
concerned]?
(c) If there has, is such deprivation consistent with the provisions of s 25(1)?
(d) If not, is such deprivation justiﬁed under s 36 of the Constitution?
(e) If it is, does it amount to expropriation for purpose of s 25(2)?
(f) If so, does the [expropriation] comply with the requirements of s 25(2)(a)
and (b)?
(g) If not, is the expropriation justiﬁed under s 36?’111
According to the FNB methodology, expropriation is a sub-set of
deprivation and therefore all expropriations are deprivations, while not all
deprivations are expropriations. This categorisation makes it possible to
postpone the question of expropriation until it has been established whether
a particular interference with property rights amounts to deprivation that
complies with s 25(1) or, if it is not, whether such a deprivation is justiﬁed in
terms of s 36(1) of the Constitution.112 In the paragraphs below we apply the
FNB methodology to the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third
107 Section 25 can be divided into two main parts, subsecs (1)–(3), read with subsec
(4); and subsecs (5)–(9), read with subsec (4). The purpose of subsecs (1)–(3) is to
protect existing property rights and interests against unconstitutional state interfer-
ence. The purpose of subsecs (4)–(9) is to legitimate and promote land and other
related reforms:A J van derWalt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) 16.
108 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality & another; Bissett & others v
Buffalo City Municipality & others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign & others v MEC,
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng, & others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and
Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 32ff; National
Credit Regulator v Opperman & others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 66; Agri South Africa v
Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 48 Arun Property Development
(Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC) paras 58–60; Shoprite Checkers
(Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental
Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape & others [2015] ZACC 23 para 37.
109 Theunis Roux ‘Property’ in Stu Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South
Africa Vol 3 2 ed (OS 2003) at 46-2.
110 Supra note 103 para 100.
111 Roux inWoolman et al op cit note 109 at 46-3.
112 Supra note 103 paras 57-59.
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parties’ property to determine whether, if challenged, it is constitutionally
valid.113 In line with Roux’s analysis (which ﬁnds support in the majority of
subsequent decisions), we take it for granted that the deprivation question
and the arbitrariness question will be the main points of focus for this analysis.
(b) Law of general application
The ﬁrst part of s 25(1) deals with the requirement of law of general
application. Section 25(1) does not insulate property against deprivation but
protects property against unauthorised and arbitrary deprivation.114 If the
deprivation is not authorised by law of general application the matter ends
there because such a deprivation is unconstitutional for lack of authority.115
However, the reference in s 25(1) to ‘law of general application’ instead of ‘a
law of general application’ indicates that regulatory deprivation of property
may also be authorised by the common law.116 The common-law principles
that govern the extension of the hypothec to third parties’ property will
satisfy this requirement. The common-law principles regarding the lessor’s
tacit hypothec provide that the lessor may, in terms of s 31(1) or s 32 of the
Magistrates’ Courts Act, apply to the court for an order that mandates the
sheriff to attach all movable property found on the leased premises.When the
sheriff effects the attachment of movable property, he does so under the
authority of the common law (as complemented by the relevant legislation
and as interpreted in the case law) and under instruction from a court acting
within the boundaries of the law.
A signiﬁcant implication of this analysis is that, in so far as the attachment
of third parties’ property by the sheriff amounts to a deprivation, it is the
common law that should be challenged for non-compliance with s 25(1),
and not the attachment.
(c) Deprivation of property
In terms of the FNB methodology, the ﬁrst question is whether the interest
that is affected by the attachment qualiﬁes as property for purposes of s 25.117
113 Roux in Woolman et al op cit note 109 at 46-21–46-25 argues that if the FNB
methodology is followed, it is unlikely that a constitutional property dispute would
ever proceed through all the stages. Furthermore, the three threshold questions
(whether the applicant is a beneﬁciary who qualiﬁes for the protection of s 25,
whether the affected interest is property and whether the interest was indeed
infringed upon) are apparently ‘sucked into’ the arbitrariness test. He contends that
the arbitrariness test tends to dominate the s 25 inquiry, and as a result, the general
limitation clause (s 36) has receded into the background. See further Van der Walt op
cit note 107 at 75–8.
114 The law of general application requirement also appears in ss 25(2) and 36(1) of
the Constitution.
115 Van derWalt op cit note 107 at 236.
116 In S v Thebus & another 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) para 65 the court held that the
common law is law of general application. See further Du Plessis & others v De Klerk &
another 1996 (3) SA850 (CC) para 44.
117 See First National Bank supra note 103 para 46.
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The constitutional property clause does not deﬁne ‘property’, but merely
provides that property is not limited to land.118 In FNB the Constitutional
Court conﬁrmed that ownership of corporeal movables and land are at the
heart of the constitutional concept of property.119 The third party’s invecta et
illata are corporeal movables brought on to the leased premises by the lessee
and thus clearly fall within the scope of ‘property’ for purposes of s 25.
Since the question whether third parties’ invecta et illata are property for
purposes of s 25 is answered afﬁrmatively, the next question is whether there
is a deprivation of property if the lessor’s tacit hypothec is extended to third
parties’ property.120 The Constitutional Court initially deﬁned deprivation as
‘[a]ny interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private
property’.121 Furthermore, the court has expressly stated that ‘[d]ispossessing
an owner of all rights, use and beneﬁt to and of corporeal movable goods, is a
prime example of deprivation’.122 The question is whether the creation of a
real security right by operation of law in favour of the lessor qualiﬁes as a
deprivation in that sense. To acquire the hypothec, the lessor must seek the
assistance of the court,123 either by having the sheriff of the court attach
property that is on the premises or by applying for an interim interdict to
prevent removal of property from the leased premises.124 The lessor’s tacit
hypothec entails that the lessor can enforce an ongoing attachment of the
property, including the third party’s property, until the rent in arrears is paid.
The deprivation of the third party’s property occurs at the moment when a
real security right is created in favour of the lessor without the third party’s
co-operation, with the effect that the third party can no longer freely use or
dispose the property. Attachment of the third party’s property amounts to an
interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of the property that
amounts to a deprivation for purposes of s 25(1), since it limits his entitle-
ment to dispose of his property in any manner he wishes. Since the ﬁrst two
118 Section 25(4)(b) of the Constitution.
119 Supra note 103 para 51.
120 Ibid para 46.
121 Ibid para 57. In Mkontwana supra note 108 para 32 the Constitutional Court
apparently altered the FNB deﬁnition of deprivation by requiring ‘[a]t the very least,
substantial interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on
property use or enjoyment found in an open and democratic society would amount
to deprivation’. However, this deﬁnition has not generally been accepted in either
case law or academic commentary. For case law in this regard, see Reflect-All 1025 CC
& others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, &
another 2009 (6) SA391 (CC) para 36; National Credit Regulator v Opperman supra note
108 para 66; Agri South Africa supra note 108 para 48 Shoprite Checkers v MEC for
Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape supra note 108
paras 73–6. For academic criticism of the Mkontwana decision, see A J van der Walt
‘Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela
Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Cam-
paign v MEC for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng (2005) 122 SALJ 75.
122 Supra note 13 para 61.
123 Webster v Ellison supra note 5 at 94. See also Badenhorst et al op cit note 6 at 405.
124 In terms of s 31(1) or s 32 of theMagistrates’CourtsAct 32 of 1944.
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FNB questions have been answered in the afﬁrmative, we turn to consider
the third FNB question, namely whether the deprivation satisﬁes the other
requirements of s 25(1).
(d) The non-arbitrariness test
Section 25(1) requires that the law of general application in question may not
permit arbitrary deprivation of property.125 The provision does not proscribe
(properly authorised) deprivation of property as such; it is only arbitrary
deprivation that is open to constitutional challenge. Therefore, as far as the
common law authorises the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec for arrear
rent to movables that belong to third parties other than the lessee, the
implication of s 25(1) is that it may not permit arbitrary deprivation of
property. In FNB the Constitutional Court held that ‘[a] deprivation of
property is arbitrary as meant by section 25 when the ‘‘law’’ referred to in
section 25(1) does not provide sufﬁcient reason for the particular deprivation
in question or is ‘‘procedurally unfair’’ ’.126
In this article we assume, without analysis and without expressing a ﬁnal
view, that ss 31(1) and 32 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act are procedurally fair
because both forms of the deprivation that are authorised by these sections
(an attachment order and a non-removal interdict) have to be issued by a
court of law exercising a discretion. It is unlikely that a deprivation that
results from such a court order will be procedurally unfair.127 Accordingly,
we focus on the sufﬁcient-reason part of the test.
In our view, the main issue in an arbitrariness challenge in terms of the
extension of the hypothec will focus on the fact that the extension renders
the hypothec applicable to property that belongs to a third party who is not
the debtor. The same problem was also at the heart of the FNB case. In FNB,
the bank (FNB) was owner of certain vehicles that were in the possession of
the customs debtor. The state (the South African Revenue Services)
established a statutory lien over the vehicles to enforce payment of a customs
debt.128 The Constitutional Court had to decide whether the creation and
enforcement of the state’s security interest in the property belonging to an
‘innocent’ third party (FNB) constituted an arbitrary deprivation of property.
Before the court came to its decision it developed a method that must be
followed to establish whether or not there is sufﬁcient reason for the
deprivation.129 The starting point is that a deprivation of property is
substantively arbitrary in terms of s 25(1) if there is insufﬁcient reason for it.
The court stated that a complexity of relationships has to be considered in
125 SeeRoux inWoolman et al op cit note 109 at 46-20.
126 Supra note 103 para 100. See further Reflect-All 1025 CC supra note 121 para
39.
127 See generally Van derWalt op cit note 107 at 264–70.
128 In terms of s 114(1)(a)(ii) of the Customs and ExciseAct 91 of 1964.
129 Supra note 103 para 100.
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order to establish sufﬁcient reason.130 The complexity of relationships
includes the relationship between the means employed (deprivation) and the
ends sought to be achieved (purpose of deprivation)131 and the relationship
between the purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is
affected.132 In addition, regard must be had to the relationship between the
purpose of the deprivation and the nature of the property as well as the extent
of the deprivation.133 The court adopted a substantive proportionality
interpretation of the non-arbitrariness requirement and concluded that in the
absence of a close nexus between the owner of the vehicles (FNB) and the
customs debt, and between the customs creditor (SARS) and the owner of
vehicles, there was insufﬁcient reason for s 114 of the Customs and Excise
Act to deprive third parties of their property by way of a statutory security
right. Accordingly, the court held that the deprivation caused by s 114 of the
Customs and ExciseAct was arbitrary for purposes of s 25(1).134
Section 114 of the Customs and ExciseAct, which was at issue in the FNB
case, had the effect of extending the creditor’s statutory lien to unrelated and
uninvolved third parties’ property; the third party owner of the affected
movables in that case was neither the customs debtor nor connected with the
customs debt. The property that was subjected to the statutory lien had no
connection with the customs debt either. Similarly, the lessor’s tacit hypothec
provides that if the lessee’s and/or the sub-lessee’s movable property proves
insufﬁcient to satisfy the lessor’s claim for arrear rent against the lessee, the
lessor’s tacit hypothec may extend to third parties’ property found on the
leased premises. It is signiﬁcant that both s 114 of the Customs and ExciseAct
and the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec involve the extension of real
security rights to third parties’ property that just happens to be present on the
debtor’s premises at the time when the non-consensual security right is
created.
A signiﬁcant difference between FNB and the extension of the lessor’s tacit
hypothec, however, is that the statutory provision in FNB favoured the state,
whereas the common-law principle that provides for the extension of the
lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property favours private creditors. It
130 Ibid para 100(b).
131 Ibid para 100(a).
132 Ibid para 100(c).
133 Ibid para 100 (d).
134 Ibid para 109. The FNB judgment was followed in Reflect-All 1025 CC supra
note 121. Prior to the FNB decision it was unclear whether South African courts
would follow a ‘thin’ rationality or a ‘thick’ proportionality-type interpretation of the
non-arbitrariness requirement. In FNB the court held the test involved will vary
between a mere rationality and a full proportionality approach, depending on the
context of each case. Roux in Woolman et al op cit note 109 at 46-24 argues that the
Constitutional Court deliberately reserved almost absolute discretion to itself to
decide future cases in a manner it deems ﬁt. Furthermore, the non-arbitrariness test
will dominate the constitutional property inquiry and the level of scrutiny of the
non-arbitrariness test will vacillate between rationality review at the lower end of the
scale, and something just short of a review for proportionality at the other end.
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might be thought that statutory security rights that favour the state should be
treated more carefully, but that consideration does not apply to the extension
of the landlord’s hypothec. Furthermore, the mere fact that the extension
serves the purpose of strengthening real security rights is not in itself a
shortcoming that could lead to constitutional invalidity. The court in FNB
held that ‘[t]o exact payment of a customs debt is a legitimate and important
legislative purpose, essential for the ﬁnancial well-being of the country and in
the interest of all its inhabitants’.135 By analogy, it could be said that the
enforcement of private debts such as the lessor’s tacit hypothec serves the
same useful purpose of strengthening the economic system of securities. The
question is whether that consideration is sufﬁcient to justify the extension of
the real security right to third parties’ property and the deprivation of
property that it causes. In effect, the court in FNB held that it was not: the
nexus between the purpose of the statutory security right, the property
affected by it and the affected property owner was not strong enough to
justify the effect, namely that an uninvolved third party would be deprived of
property that is not related to the debt. In the paragraph below we apply the
FNB non-arbitrariness test to the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to
third parties’ property, focusing especially on the interplay of factors set out in
FNB, to determine whether there is sufﬁcient reason to deprive a third party
of his property to ensure payment of the lessee’s debt.
The lessor’s tacit hypothec has similar effects to those of s 114 of the
Customs and Excise Act, namely that both create real security rights that
extend to include a third party’s property. In fact, the lessor’s tacit hypothec
upon attachment creates a real security right over property belonging to
three categories of persons, namely the lessee, the sub-lessee and the third
party, whereas s 114 of the Act created a real security right over the property
of only two categories of persons, namely the customs debtor and third
parties.
The only nexus required by s 114 of the Act between the third party’s
property and the customs debtor to render the third party’s property subject
to the statutory lien was ‘possession and control’ or the presence of the third
party’s property on ‘any premises in the possession or under the control’ of
the custom debtor.Accordingly, the commissioner of SARS could detain and
sell any property, including third parties’ property found on ‘any premises in
the possession or under the control’ of the customs debtor. The customs
debtor needed only be in ‘possession or control’ of the premises and not of
the property itself. Therefore, the customs debtor could even have been
unaware of the presence of the third party’s property on his premises.
In terms of the lessor’s tacit hypothec, attachment of third parties’ property
is based on either imputed consent or the doctrine of estoppel. According to
the imputed-consent approach, a third party is taken to have consented that
his property can be utilised as security for the lessee’s arrear rent. The lessor
135 Supra note 103 para 108.
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bears the onus to prove that the property was on the leased premises with the
knowledge and consent of the third party; that he was unaware that the
property belongs to the third party; and that the property was on the leased
premises permanently and for the lessee’s use. It is worth noting that the last
requirement of the imputed-consent approach, namely that the third party’s
property must be on the leased premises for the use of the lessee, creates a
nexus between the third party’s property and the duty to pay rent (which is
debt that is secured by the hypothec). This requirement and the nexus that it
creates distinguish the security right in s 114 of the Customs and Excise Act
from the case of the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec. Section 114 of
the Act required only the presence of the third party’s property on ‘any
premises in the possession or under the control’ of the customs debtor,
whereas the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property
requires both possession (presence on the premises) and use of the third
party’s property by the lessee, on the premises. The extension of the lessor’s
tacit hypothec also requires that the third parties’ property must be present
permanently on the leased premises, which s 114 of the Customs and Excise
Act did not require. Thus, in terms of s 114 of theAct, third parties’ property
that was in the customs debtor’s possession purely by chance and for a short
period could be subject to the statutory lien, but that would not be possible in
the case of extending the hypothec.
According to the second approach to the extension of the hypothec,
namely the doctrine of estoppel, it is argued that the third party is estopped
(or precluded) from raising the rei vindicatio against the lessor because he has
negligently induced the lessor to believe that the property belongs to the
lessee. We contend that the doctrine of estoppel (with the fault requirement)
should also be regarded as a justiﬁcation for the extension of the lessor’s tacit
hypothec, for much the same reasons that we set out in the previous
paragraph. If it is found that the third party (with fault) did induce the lessor
to believe that the property belongs to the lessee, it is highly unlikely that the
property would have been present on the premises just ﬂeetingly and
without any real connection with the lessee’s use of the premises.
Accordingly, the correct application of both justiﬁcations for the extension
of the hypothec will mean that if the third party was unaware that his
property was present on the leased premises, his property should not be
subject to the hypothec. Thus, if the third party was not aware of the
presence of his property on the lessor’s premises, he should not be held to be
negligent. In other words, the correct application of the principles that
regulate the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property
implies that the fault requirement of the doctrine of estoppel will not be
easily established. However, if the estoppel denier fails to prove that he was
not negligent with the whereabouts of his property, the attachment of his
property might be justiﬁed.
Although s 114 of the Customs and Excise Act and the extension of the
lessor’s tacit hypothec have similar effects (creating real security rights over
third parties’ property), they also differ in important aspects. First, the lessor’s
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tacit hypothec only extends to third parties’ property if the property of the
lessee and/or the sub-lessee proves to be insufﬁcient to satisfy the lessor’s
claim for rent. Secondly, unlike s 114 of the Act, the extension of the lessor’s
tacit hypothec requires that certain requirements must be met before third
parties’ property could be subject to the lessor’s tacit hypothec. Our view is
that these requirements serve as sufﬁcient protection of third parties’ interests,
whereas s 114 of the Customs and Excise Act provided no similar protection
since it required only the presence of third parties’ property on the premises
in the possession or under the control of the customs debtor. Therefore, if
correctly applied and successfully proven, the requirements for the extension
of the lessor’s tacit hypothec establish the necessary connection between the
third party’s property and the purpose of deprivation that would prevent the
extension of the hypothec from causing an arbitrary deprivation of the third
parties’ property. For this reason we contend that the extension of the lessor’s
tacit hypothec to third parties’ property does not amount to arbitrary
deprivation of third parties’ property as meant by s 25(1) of the Constitution.
In terms of the FNB methodology, if the deprivation is consistent with the
provisions of s 25(1), the inquiry proceeds to the ﬁfth question, since there is
no constitutional violation that requires justiﬁcation provided for by the
fourth question, viz whether such deprivation amounts to expropriation for
purposes of s 25(2).136 Since South African law requires that expropriation
should be authorised by legislation and there is no common-law authorisa-
tion for expropriation, it is impossible that principles of the common law can
be a source of expropriation.137 It is therefore unnecessary to consider
whether a deprivation caused by the extension of the hypothec amounts to
expropriation.
VII CONCLUSION
The lessor’s tacit hypothec only extends to third parties’ property in
exceptional circumstances. The lessor must ﬁrst execute against the lessee’s
property found on the leased premises when rent is due but not paid. It is
only when the lessee’s property proves insufﬁcient to satisfy the lessor’s claim
for arrear rent that the lessor’s tacit hypothec could extend to third parties’
property. However, the mere fact that the lessee’s property found on the
leased premises is insufﬁcient to cover the arrear rent does not imply that the
lessor can use third parties’ property to satisfy his claim for arrear rent.
Extending the hypothec to cover the property of third parties must be
justiﬁed.According to the case law, this justiﬁcation could assume one of two
forms. The courts tend to collapse the two justiﬁcations into a single enquiry
that is not clearly distinguished or applied consistently, but we prefer a
properly dualistic approach in which the two are distinguished clearly and
consistently.
136 Supra note 103 para 46(d).
137 Antonie Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 2 ed (2001) 10. See further Van der Walt op
cit note 107 at 346.
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According to the imputed-consent approach, the lessor who obtained an
attachment order before he knew that some of the property on the premises
does not belong to his lessee must prove that the third party’s property was
brought on to the leased premises with actual knowledge of its owner and for
permanent use on the premises by the lessee. According to the estoppel
approach, the lessor must prove misrepresentation by the third party,
prejudice, causation, and fault. It is only when the lessor has successfully
relied on either of the two justiﬁcations and proven the requirements for it
that he can sell third parties’ property in execution to satisfy his claim for
arrear rent.
Since the SMMPA excludes a number of potential cases in that it protects
third parties who are instalment agreement creditors and notarial bond
holders against the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec, it appears that in
practice there will probably be few, if any, cases in which the lessor’s tacit
hypothec will be extended to third parties’ property based on imputed
consent. Furthermore, if estoppel (inclusive of the fault requirement) is
correctly applied, there may equally only be a few cases in which estoppel
will serve as the basis for attachment of third parties’ property, especially since
the lessor must ﬁrst prove the third party’s negligence. Applied in this way,
the limited extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property
on the basis of either imputed consent or estoppel is justiﬁable. Notwith-
standing the controversies surrounding the justiﬁcations for extending the
lessor’s tacit hypothec to third parties’ property, we argue that correct
application of the common-law principles, as set out above, adequately
protects third parties whose movables are not covered by the SMMPA
against the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec.
We acknowledge that the justiﬁcations for extending the lessor’s tacit
hypothec to third parties’ property are controversial. However, our view is
that the correct application of the common-law principles, as well as the
statutory protection that has been introduced to exclude a large number of
cases from the reach of the extension, adequately protect third parties against
the extension of the lessor’s tacit hypothec. We conclude that the extension
of the lessor’s tacit hypothec does not constitute an arbitrary deprivation as
meant by s 25 of the Constitution, and it is therefore constitutionally valid.
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